Shared Reality
Your systems and teams hold different parts of the picture. Shared Reality connects their evidence about the same assets, dependencies and operating conditions, so specialists can expose gaps and assess operational and cyber risk together.
Security may know the remote-access path. Operations know why that access is needed. Facilities know the power and communications dependencies. The service owner knows the consequence of interruption and the authority required for change.
When each team works from a different version of the environment, important relationships and trade-offs are easy to miss. Shared Reality connects the evidence and context so the reasoning can cross those boundaries.
The same controller can have an exposed access path, an unsupported component, a shared power dependency and a recovery step known to one person.
Those conditions concern the same service. They need different evidence, different expertise and potentially different actions. Bringing them together makes the decision more complete.
Sites, locations, assets, people, digital identities and services need consistent references. Technical, physical and operational relationships connect them to the service being assessed.
Retain what each source reported: observations, configuration, intended designs, documents, tests and human verification. A source’s claim and an established fact remain distinguishable.
Know when evidence was captured, when a condition applied and which environment state supported a conclusion. Revisit that conclusion when relevant dependencies or conditions change.
Preserve missing, stale and contradictory information. Explain which conclusion it affects and what evidence or authorised decision is needed to resolve it.
Keep service criticality, process knowledge, engineering constraints and accountable decisions with their source and scope. Human judgement is part of the governed basis for action.
A common foundation lets the domains work together without making their technical meanings interchangeable.
Our domain architecture spans network security, physical infrastructure, asset lifecycle, identity and access, compute, data and recovery, applications, OT control and physical security. Each domain applies its own technical meaning to the shared evidence.
Questions about power, physical access, identity authority, process dependencies or recovery require their own evidence and specialist interpretation. The evidence, supported reasoning and specialist judgement behind each conclusion remain visible.
Explore all nine domainsThe cyber view considers compromise, exposure, privilege and controls. The operational view considers safe operation, continuity, dependencies and recovery.
Service owners and specialists connect those results to consequence. Shared data does not justify skipping a reasoning step or inventing the effect on the organisation.
An asset, identity or dependency should mean the same thing to the security team, the engineer and the service owner. What it means for risk depends on the question being assessed.
Services, assets, identities, people, locations, physical dependencies and operating context, with provenance, uncertainty and disagreement retained.
Domains interpret the same identities, relationships and evidence using their own rules. Their results support the two risk assessments.
Establish the conditions an attacker or unauthorised actor could use, the controls that apply and the evidence behind the conclusion.
Establish how failure, degradation or change could affect the service, the people operating it and the capability the organisation needs.
Bring both views to the service owner. Compare consequence, evidence, treatment options and operating constraints without hiding them in a single combined score.
Can the person or system reach the target?
Can it authenticate, and what is it permitted to do?
Can that permitted action change or affect the asset?
How does the asset support the process or service?
What outcome is evidenced in this client context?
Each step needs its own evidence. A network path does not, by itself, prove a control action or an operational consequence. Safeguards need evidence of applicability, current state and effectiveness too.
Configuration evidence establishes a vendor path to a production system. The service owner confirms that the path is used for maintenance. The permitted actions and process dependencies need their own evidence.
Check effective reachability, authentication, privileges, segmentation and logging. A reachable endpoint alone does not establish the ability to change the process.
Establish the maintenance need, control and visibility dependencies, and the consequence of removing access. The service owner and relevant engineers determine the operating constraints.
Agree the required access and any restrictions, a safe change window, fallback and authority. After authorised work, verify both that inappropriate access is prevented and that required maintenance still works.
These scenarios explain the method. They are not client outcomes or claims that every domain is automated.
Define the outcome before action. After the change, establish what improved, what remains and whether the operating requirements still hold.
Illustrative scenario: production remote access
Reconcile the source assertions into the same asset identities, access relationships and service dependencies. Preserve the evidence time, provenance, contradictions and gaps.
Assets + relationships + state + evidence over time.
Talk to us about the risks, the operating constraints and the work your team needs to move forward.